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achievement to state the reviewer’s
opinion that the book would have
profited from more rigorous editing; the
elimination of some material (especially
in the first two chapters) of interest only
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This excellent study is an analysis of
the United States’ use of its armed forces
to achieve political objectives, and an
evaluation of how effective this use has’
been. On the basis of a stringent
definition, 215 incidents- ranging from
a naval vessel visiting a friendly port
through forcefully establishing a military
presence-are identified in which the
United States utilized its armed forces
for political objectives, including both
reassuring allies and warning opponents,
between 1 January 1946 and 31 December
1975. A representative sample of 15
percent (33) of these were subjected to
aggregate analyses. The result of these
analyses are presented in four chapters
of the book. Also included are five
chapters written by specialists that
present five, carefully selected, paired
case studies. David K. Hall analyzes U.S.
actions concerning the Laotian War of
1962 and the Indo-Pakistani War of 1971;
William B. Quandt, the crises of Lebanon
in 1958 and in Jordan in 1970; Jerome N.
Slater, the episodes involving the Do-
minican Republic in 1961 and 1966;
Robert M. Slusser, the Berlin Crises
of 1958-1959 and 1961; and Philip
Windsor, Soviet menaces toward Yugo-
slavia in 1951 and Czechoslovakia in
1968. Belchman and Kaplan synthesize
the results of the aggregate analyses and
the case studies in a thoughtful, balanced,
and policy-relevant concluding chapter.
The study has many strengths. It
builds on the existing literature, par-
ticularly Deterrence in American Policy
by Alexander L. George and Richard
Smoke, carefully noting points of agree-
ment and disagreement. The aggregate
analyses and the case studies nicely
complement each other, the former
providing a broad structure and the
latter, contextual detail. A high level of
intellectual rigor is maintained through-
out the book. Precise definitions are
used, logical reasoning is stressed, and
conclusions are firmly based on the
evidence. The study takes the political
objectives of U.S. policymakers as a
given without endorsing or rejecting
them; it is a carefully circumscribed,
technical, and professional analysis. The
presentation is crisp and clear and
happily free of jargon.
The study concludes that in the short
run the use of armed force has had a high
probability of contributing to achieving
U.S. objectives. In the longer run (3
years later), this probability is greatly
diminished. The discrete use of force has
had little impact on broad economics, po-
litical and social trends. Delaying changes,
however, has been useful to the United
States in allowing opportunities for
structuring the changes and for rallying
domestic support to accept them. Not
surprizingly the use of force is shown to
be more effective in reinforcing the be-
havior of allies, neutrals, and opponents
than in altering their behavior. These
conclusions are just a small sample of the
richness of the book. It is must reading
for those interested in contemporary
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In 1972 the National Endowment for
the Arts began a survey of the quality of
federal government architecture. It prob-
ably was not an easy assignment. Before
